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submitted that the proper approach should be to analyze each
case in terms of the test laid down by the statute - whether the
activities in question threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in a business affecting commerce to cease doing business
with another person
rather than establish a substitute rule
that all secondary consumer or products picketing is prohibited.
It is not submitted that the results would be different in the instant case, but the suggested approach would avoid establishment of mechanical rules for applying the new secondary boycott
provisions and would require a more careful consideration of the
statute as applied to the facts of each case.
-

Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr.

SECURITY DEVICES -

BUILDING CONTRACTS - MATERIAL MAN

DISTINGUISHED FROM SUBCONTRACTOR

Plaintiff, general contractor for the construction of a public
building, engaged a corporation to furnish structural steel conforming to plaintiff's architectural specifications. The corporation then contracted with defendant who agreed to fabricate in
its own shop and deliver to the job site certain of the steel
products. Defendant delivered the material but neither defendant nor the corporation did any work on the structure itself. The
corporation went bankrupt without paying defendant and defendant filed an affidavit of its claim in accordance with statutes
providing for the protection of certain furnishers of material
for the construction of public buildings.' Plaintiff sued to have
the affidavit cancelled and erased from the mortgage records.
The district court found that the corporation was a material
man and not a subcontractor, and since suppliers of material
to material men are not given the benefit of the statutes in
question, 2 ordered the cancellation of the affidavit. On appeal,
Analy&ii, 48 GEO. L.J. 346, 352-54 (1959). Mr. Previant contends that Congress
would have used the word picketing had it intended to prohibit picketing automatically.

He also suggests that a blanket prohibition on peaceful picketing raises

serious first amendment freedom questions. See also Comment, 45 CoBN. L.Q. 724
(1960).
1. LA. R.S. 38:2241 et 8eq. (1950).
2. The instant case is the first case so holding under the present revised
statutes. However, the cases of American Creosote Works v. City of Monroe,
175 La. 905, 144 So. 612 (1932) and J. Watts Kearny & Sons v. Perry, 174 La.

411, 141 So. 13 (1932)

had reached this result under La. Acts 1918, No. 224.

The critical language of that act, found in Section 1, provided that: "When public

buildings . . . or public work of any character are about to be constructed, ...
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to the Louisiana court of appeal held, affirmed. One who fur-'
nishes material but who does not pcrform any labor in attaching
it to or incorporating it in the building is a material man even
though there has been labor expended in preparing the material
to meet specifications. Jesse F. Heard & Sons v. Southwest Steel
Products, 124 So.2d 211 (La. App. 1960).
In order to insure payment for labor and materials employed
in the construction of public works statutory protection has been
given to certain furnishers of these commoditiesY Claimants
who file affidavits of their claim timely are given a cause of
action against the governing authority for whom the work is
being done if it has paid the contractor without deducting the
amount of the claims thus filed.4 The statute safeguards material men who supply contractors 5 or subcontractors, 6 but despite
rather broad language it has been interpreted to afford no protection to material men who supply other material men.7 Prior
to the instant case, there were no decisions in Louisiana on the
question of whether one who contracts to furnish material upon
which labor must be performed in order for it to conform to
required specifications but who does no work in incorporating
the material into the structure is a subcontractor or a material
man.8 At common law 9 a few cases have held such a person to
under contract in excess of $500 at the expense of the State, or any parish, city,
• . . public board or body, it shall be the duty of the official representative
thereof . . . to require of the contractor a bond, with good and solvent and sufficient surety, . . . for the payment by the contractor and by all subcontractors
for all work done, labor performed, or material furnished in the construction . . .
of such building, road, work or improvement." This language is almost identical
with that found in LA. R.S. 38:2241 (1950), and the court in the instant case
regarded the prior jurisprudence as controlling the question.
3. LA. R.S. 38:2241-2247 (1950).
4. Id. 38:2242. In addition, the governing authority for whom the work is
being done is required to exact from the contractor a surety bond to protect those
suppliers of labor and materials embraced within the statute. Id. 38:2241.
5. Id. 38:2241.
6. Ibid.
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Probably the case closest to this situation was American Creosote Works
v. City of Monroe, 175 La. 905, 144 So. 612 (1932). There one who furnished
poles meeting certain specifications as to size and creosoting for use in the city's
municipal lighting system was held to be a material man and therefore entitled
to no protection by virtue of La. Acts 1918, No. 224. The court pointed out that
the poles had been ordered by the city for stock and were not wanted for any
particular work. It also said that "the contractor whom the law intends by Act
No. 229 of 1916 and Act No. 224 of 1918, is one who constructs for another some
work of fixed and permanent nature, which can neither be kept nor disposed of,
but must be surrendered to him for whom the work was done; and a subcontractor
is one who undertakes to do for the contractor part of the work which the contractor has undertaken. We see in this case no contractor or subcontractor, but
simply a sale and resale." Id. at 911, 144 So. at 614.
9. In assessing the persuasive weight to be given the common law views, it
-should be borne in mind that at common law building contract security is purely
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be a subcontractor, 10 but the majority holds that he is material
man."
The court in the instant case concluded that the best view
was that in order to be classified as a subcontractor under the
statute it would be necesary to perform some labor in incorporating the materials supplied into the building or improvements. This was based on the principle of stricti juris with
respect to such statutes and on the idea that it would be an unwise policy to classify all persons who furnished any materials
which required construction to specifications as subcontractors.
The court feared that a contrary holding would allow the owner
and subcontractor to be harassed by claims of those with whom
they had not contracted and of which they had no knowledge.
In the instant case the classification of the furnisher of materials was with respect to statutes regulating the security for
public building contracts. Of additional interest is the question
of whether the same rule will be followed when the statutes that
12
regulate security for private building contracts are at issue.
On the basis of the prior jurisprudence it would seem that the
statutes as presently worded afford protection to a material
man who supplies a subcontractor, 8 but not to one who supplies
statutory, and the effect of the classification as material man in one jurisdiction
may be quite different from the effect of a similar classification in another jurisdiction.
10. Holt & Bugbee Co. v. City of Melrose, 311 Mass. 424, 41 N.E.2d 562
(1942) (lumber worked into different sizes and dimensions to meet specifications,
furnisher of subcontractor given right to be paid out of funds held by city);
Illinois Steel Warehouse Co. v. Hennepin Lumber Co., 149 Minn. 157, 182 N.W.
994 (1921) (structural steel prepared and furnished, lien to supplier of subcontractor but not to supplier of material man) ; Western Sash & Door Co. v.
Buckner, 80 Mo. App. 95 (1899) (doors and window sashes, lien to furnisher of
subcontractor but not to furnisher of material man).
11. Rudolph Ilegener Co. v. Frost, 60 Ind.App. 108, 108 N.E. 16 (1915)
(stairs were specially constructed for house, lien available to subcontractor but
not material man) ; Foster Lumber Co. v. Sigma Chi Chapter House, 49 Ind.
App. 528, 97 N.E. 801 (1912) (stone cut to certain dimensions and carved to
specifications, no lien available to subcontractor but lien available to material
man if claim timely filed) ; Rebisso v. Frick, 159 Ohio St. 449, 112 N.E.2d 651
(1953) (concrete septic tank cemented together at site of construction, lien under
statute granted to material man but not to subcontractor) ; Matzinger v. Harvard
Lumber Co., 115 Ohio St. 555, 155 N.E. 131 (1926) (doors, sashes, and similar
material furnished to meet specifications, material man and subcontractor both
had liens but subcontractor required to file affidavit within a certain time).
12. LA. R.S. 9:4801 et seq. (1950).
13. The case of Ketteringham v. Eureka Homestead Society, 140 La. 176, 72.
So. 916 (1916) held that under La. Acts 1914, No. 221, a furnisher of materials
to a subcontractor was given no lien. The language of the statute which the court
seems to have relied upon was: "Every person having a claim against the undertaker, contractor, master mechanic or engineer shall" file his claim within a certain time. The court pointed out that if the act had read, as did La. Acts 1916,
No. 262, that: "Every person having a claim against the undertaker, contractor,
subcontractor, master mechanic, or engineer shall" file his claim as specified, the
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another material man.' 4 The same appears true with respect to
those who perform labor for subcontractors as contrasted with
those who perform labor for material men. 15 Though the protection afforded claimants under the private contracts security
statutes differs to some extent from that under the public con-

tracts statutes,

6

the instant case furnishes strong persuasive

authority for the application of the same rule of classification
in cases involving private building contracts.
Robert B. Butler IlI
TORTS -

AGENCY -

LIABILITY OF ARCHITECT FOR FAILURE TO

SUPERVISE WORK OF SUB-CONTRACTOR
Plaintiff brought a tort action to recover damages for the
death of her husband, an employee of a plumbing sub-contractor.
decision would have gone the other way. The question was presented again in the
case of Frank v. Waters, 162 La. 255, 110 So. 413 (1926). This time the applicable statute was La. Acts 1922, No. 139, which provided for the filing of a
claim by "Every person having a claim against the undertaker, contractor, master
mechanic or contracting engineer. . . ." The court gave no lien to a material man
who had supplied a subcontractor, saying that the legislature had had both the
Ketteringham holding and dicta before it when it chose language of the type in the
1914 statute over that of the 1916 statute and so must have intended that the
interpretation placed on the 1914 language be followed. Jeter v. Lyon, 8 La. App.
115 (1928) followed the Waters case. The latest case dealing with the question of
whether a material man who supplies a subcontractor has a lien is Dixie Bldg.
Material Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 167 La. 399, 119 So.
405 (1928). That case held that under La. Acts 1926, No. 298, such a material
man was afforded a lien. The court relied on Section 1 of the act and not on
language similar to that used in the above cases. However, the wording of Section
2 of the act provides for the filing of a claim by "every person having a claim
against the . . . subcontractor." In light of these decisions it would seem that a
furnisher of material to a subcontractor is afforded a lien under the present statutes. In the first place, Section 1 of the present act is very similar to the first
section of La. Acts 1926, No. 298, under which a lien was granted. Secondly, the
second section of the present act contains provision for the filing of a claim by
"every person having a claim against the subcontractor." LA. R.S.
9:4802
(1950).
14. In the case of Patterson v. Lumberman's Supply Co., 167 So. 471 (La.
App. 1936), it was held that the supplier of a material man had no lien under
La. Acts 1926, No. 298. The court relied on Sections 1 and 12 of that act and
the stricti juris rule to reach that conclusion. There seems to be no wording in
the present statutes which would justify a departure from this result.
15. The same statutes which provide protection for those who furnish material
also provide protection for those who furnish labor. Since the courts have refused
protection to material men who supply other material men under these statutes it
would appear that they would reach the same result with respect to laborers who
perform labor for material men.
16. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into a detailed comparison of
the public and private building contract security laws. Under both the claimant
may, in certain circumstances, be protected by the contractor's bond and have a
right of action against the governing authority or private owner, as the case may
be. However, a claimant under a public building contract never receives a lien on
the work, while in certain instances a private contract claimant does have a lien
on the building.

